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STATES AS INTERNATIONAL LAW-BREAKERS:
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST IMMIGRANTS AND
WELFARE REFORM
Elizabeth Landry
Abstract: As part of the current "devolution revolution," policy makers at the state and
federal levels are designing proposals that would permit states to discriminate on the basis of
immigration status in determining eligibility for public education, medical care, social
services, and cash assistance. This Comment asserts that such proposals violate international
human rights norms, by which both federal and state governments are bound. Mbreover, it
maintains that legislators must consider international law when crafting proposals that would
allow discrimination on the basis of alienage. If they fail to do so, courts are obliged to
intervene and ensure that treaty provisions are not violated.

State discrimination against persons on the basis of their immigration
status in public benefits eligibility determinations, once clearly
disallowed,' soon may be standard practice in the United States. In the
past several years, residents and legislators of several states have
endorsed proposals to deny education, health, and basic social services to
undocumented immigrants.2 Although the most visible of these efforts,
California's Proposition 187, has been enjoined by a federal district court
on preemption grounds,3 the momentum has not slackened. Recently
enacted federal "welfare reform" legislation4 requires states to deny
virtually all benefits5 to illegal immigrants and sanctions state
discrimination on the basis of alienage in the provision of public benefits
to legal immigrants. 6 Similarly, a proposed amendment to federal

immigration-reform legislation would have delegated to states the
1. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (finding invalid state alienage discrimination
in eligibility determination for welfare benefits).
2. California's Proposition 187, the forerunner of the rest, was enacted in its entirety at the
November 8, 1994 general election. Illegal Aliens-Public Services, Verification, and Reporting,
1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West) [hereinafter California Proposition 187]; see also S. 2274,
14th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1996); H.R. 2933, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1995); S. 1, 74th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 1995).
3. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
4. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104193, 110 Stat. 2105.
5. Exceptions to this denial of benefits include emergency medical assistance, short-term disaster
aid, immunizations, and in-kind community services. § 401(b), 110 Stat. at 2261. In addition, a state
may choose to provide any other state or local benefits to otherwise unqualified immigrants by
enacting a law to that effect. § 411(d), 110 Stat. at 2261.
6. § 412, 110 Stat. at 2269.
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authority to deny public education to undocumented children.7 Even
Washington, historically a refugee- and immigrant-friendly state,' is not
immune from this anti-immigrant trend. State residents generated an
unsuccessful Proposition 187-like initiative in 1994, 9 and the 1996
legislative session opened with a bill to deny nearly all public benefits to
non-citizens."°
This Comment examines three proposed avenu.es of state
discrimination on the basis of alienage in the determination of eligibility
for basic public benefits: states acting on their own initiative," states
acting under a federal directive, 2 and states acting under congressional

authorization.' 3 These types of discrimination raise serious concerns for

the United States regarding its obligations under international human
rights law. In particular, such state action conflicts with the: provisions of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("the
Covenant"), 4 which the United States ratified in 1992." The Covenant's
7. 142 Cong. Rec. H2487-88 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Rep. Gallegly) (proposing
amendment to Immigration and Nationality Act). To facilitate passage, this amendment was dropped
from the final legislation. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Star. 3009 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Jim Simon, State Helpfor Women. Citizens or Not: LegislatorsProtect PrenatalCare
for Illegal Immigrants,Seattle Times, Apr. 4, 1995, at Al.
9. Washington's Initiative 653 read, in final form, "Shall public schools, hospitals and agencies
report 'apparent illegal aliens' and deny them health care, education and assistance?" Wash.
Initiative 653 (on file with Washington Law Review) [hereinafter Washington Initiative 653]. Failing
to attract the requisite number of signatures, it never reached the ballot. Ann Davis, The Return of the
Nativists, Nat'l L.J., June 19, 1995, at Al. Initiati- e sponsor Karen Small of Mount Vernon vowed to
try again: "For the next one, we'll be ready." Id.
10. See S. 6749, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1995 Wash. Laws 11. The bill, entitled "An Act Relating
to Making Welfare Work," was introduced on January 31, 1996 by Senators Hoebstatter, Schow, and
Oke and added the following new section regarding non-citizens:
(1) It is the intent of the legislature that new immigrants to Washington state provide for
themselves and their families. It is the intent of the legislature to limit access to certain public
assistance benefits by noncitizens. (2) Noncitizens are not eligible for financial grants; medical
assistance; food stamps; or nutrition services including school lunches, breakfasts, child care
nutrition programs, and women, infant and chilcren's nutrition programs.
S. 6749, § 9.
11. For example, Proposition 187 aimed at "illegal" immigrants, Proposition 187, supra note 2,
and Washington's Senate bill aimed at all "noncitizens," S. 6749.
12. For example, federal welfare reform legislation precludes state assistance for illegal
immigrants, unless a state enacts a law specifically providing benefits for such persons. § 411, 110
Stat. at 2268.
13. For example, welfare reform allows states to discriminate against legal inmmigrants in benefit
eligibility determinations. § 412, 110 Stat. at 226914. G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. D3c. A16316 (1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
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guarantees regarding nondiscrimination and family life clearly are
implicated.
Proposals that would permit states to discriminate on the basis of

alienage are in direct conflict with fundamental international human
rights norms. Decisions and comments of the Human Rights Committee 6
and jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights will be used
to sketch the parameters of these rights. 7 Using the international human
rights norm of nondiscrimination to interpret the equal protection
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, reveals a heightened standard
of equal protection scrutiny. Similarly, international norms provide
strong safeguards of family unity and privacy. In light of these standards,
this Comment argues that there are necessary limits to what Congress
may authorize the states to do. At the very least, Congress should not be
permitted to authorize the states to violate international human rights

norms regarding nondiscrimination or family life without explicitly
stating such an intent.
Part I draws the contours of the international nondiscrimination norm
and discusses the current state of U.S. law regarding alienage
discrimination, considering both its federal preemption and equal
15. Senate Report on the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 138 Cong. Rec.
S4783-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
16. The Human Rights Committee consists of 18 members recognized as experts in the field of
human rights and is authorized under the Covenant to receive reports submitted by state parties and
to hear complaints from individuals under the Optional Protocol. ICCPR, supra note 14, arts. 28, 4042; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter OP]. The
Optional Protocol is a companion instrument to the Covenant, which has not been signed or ratified
by the United States. See generally Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee 4.1-4.5
(1991).
17. Specifically, the court has interpreted analogous provisions of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
[hereinafter European Convention]. See, e.g., Inze v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987)
(interpreting Convention's nondiscrimination guarantee). The European Convention is the human
rights treaty of the European Community currently ratified by 28 members of the Community and
designed to "take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the
[United Nation's] Universal Declaration [of Human Rights]." European Convention, supra, pmbl.
The use of an international court's jurisprudence to interpret international law finds support in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations §103(2)(a) (1987), which states that judgments and
opinions of international judicial and arbitral tribunals are given substantial weight in determining
whether a rule has become international law. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 n.16
(2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing judicial decisions as one source of international law and citing opinion
from European Court of Human Rights); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 797
(D. Kan. 1980) (citing European Convention as among "principle sources of fundamental human
rights" and "indicative of the customs and usages of civilized nations"), ardon other grounds, 654
F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
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protection components. This part also examines the international human
rights guarantees regarding family unity and privacy as they relate to
aliens. Part II demonstrates the preemptive force of the Covenant's
nondiscrimination guarantee and uses the international norm to interpret
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
emergent standard of equal protection scrutiny is then applied to the
various proposed avenues of state discrimination in ordes to show their
constitutional invalidity. Finally, this part examines the ways in which
legislation that permits state discrimination on the basis of alienage in
determining eligibility for public benefits violates international norms
pertaining to family life.
I.

NONDISCRIMINATION AND FAMILY LIFE PROTECTIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

A.

The NondiscriminationNorm Is a CoreElement of I, ternational
Human Rights Law

1.

The NondiscriminationNorm as Expressedin the International
Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights

Nondiscrimination is a central tenet of all major international human
rights treaties.' The Covenant has two separate articles guaranteeing
nondiscrimination-articles 2(1) and 26. Article 2(1) "recognizes" that
state parties:
[U]ndertake[] to respect and to ensure to all individuals within
[their] territory and subject to [their] jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.' 9
Article 26 provides that:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law.... [T]he law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal
18. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 55; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/49 (1989) [hereinafter Child
Convention]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR];
ICCPR, supra note 14, arts. 2(1), 26; European Convention, supra note 17, art. 14; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [lereinafterUDHR].
19. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 2(1).
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and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.2 °
The Human Rights Committee defines discrimination as:
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is
based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,

political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth or other
status and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on
an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. 21
According to the Human Rights Committee, whereas article 2(1) only
guarantees nondiscrimination with regard to the rights set forth in the
Covenant, article 26 provides an autonomous guarantee against
nondiscrimination, not limited to Covenant rights.'
Not every differentiation constitutes discrimination.'
Certain
distinctions are permissible for aliens and juveniles, for example, and are
enumerated explicitly in the Covenant.24 In addition, "affirmative action"
or "preferential treatment" is permissible in order to correct conditions
that "prevent or impair... [the] enjoyment of human rights" by certain
groups of persons.' Such distinctions are legitimate "as long as such
action is needed to correct discrimination in fact. ' 2 6 In other words, "not
every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the
criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the
20. ICCPR, supranote 14, art. 26.
21. InternationalHuman Rights Instruments. Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies 26, 7 (1992) [hereinafter HRIIGEN].
Drawing from its experience in reviewing state reports submitted under article 40 of the Covenant,
the Human Rights Committee intends its comments to assist state parties in implementing their
Covenant obligations. Idl at 1. For a discussion of the General Comments, see Dominic McGoldrick,
The Human Rights Committee 3.33-.38 (1991).
22. HRI/GEN, supranote 21, at 27, 12 ("[Article 26] prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in
any field regulated and protected by public authorities .... Thus, when legislation is adopted by a
State party, it must comply with the requirement of article 26 that its content should not be
discriminatory. In other words, the application of the principle of nondiscrimination contained in
article 26 is not limited to those rights which are provided for in the Covenant.').
23. Id. at 26, 8 ("The enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing, however, does not
mean identical treatment in every instance.").
24. See ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 25 (stating that every "citizen" has right to participate in
political life), art. 6(5) (forbidding death penalty for juveniles and pregnant women), art. 10(3)
(requiring segregation ofjuvenile offenders from adults).
25. HRYIGEN, supranote 21, at 27, 10.
26. Id.at27, 10.
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aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant. 2 7
The Committee's considerations cf individual claims of discrimination
reflect this approach, finding discrimination only where a distinction

cannot be "justified" under the Covenant."
Because the Covenant's articles apply to all persons, aliens are entitled
to the rights guaranteed by the Covenant (unless explicitly excepted)
without discrimination on the basis of their status under immigration
laws. In addition, discrimination against persons on the basis of their
immigration status falls under the category of discrimination based on
"other status" and is prohibited by the Covenant.29 The Human Rights
Committee has made it clear that aliens are covered by the Covenant's
guarantees, stating that "[iln general, the rights set forth in the Covenant
apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or
her nationality or statelessness."3' Other United Nations (UN)
instruments allow for the discriminatory treatment of aliens,3 but the
Covenant does not.

27. Id. at 27, 13.
28. See, e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee
Under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political
Rights Concerning Communication No. R. 9/35, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 134,
9.2(b)(2)(i)(8), U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) [hereinafter Mauritian Women Case] (finding that
distinction based on sex alone not sufficient to establish discrimination and that determining factor
was lack of "sufficient justification").
29. See ICCPR, supra note 14, arts. 2(1), 26.
30. HRIIGEN, supra note 21, at 18, 9 1.
31. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD] (stating in article 1(2) that Convention will not
apply to "distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this
Convention between citizens and non-citizens"); see also Declaration on the Human Rights of
Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live, art. 2(1), G.A. Res. 144,
U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 252, U.N. Doc. A140/53 (1985) ("Nothing in this
Declaration shall be interpreted as legitimizing the illegal entry into and presence in a State of any
alien, nor shall any provision be interpreted as restricting the right of any State to promulgate laws
and regulations concerning the entry of aliens and the terms and conditions of their stay or to
establish differences between nationals and aliens. However,such laws and regulationsshall not be
incompatible with the internationallegal obligations of the state, including ,'hose in the field of
human rights.") (emphasis added). It is significant also that a recent ICERD report on the United
States' compliance with the terms of that Convention noted that Proposition 187 contained
"discriminatory and anti-constitutional" provisions in its denial of education, health care, and
welfare services to "the children of illegal migrant workers." Maurice Glele-Ahanhanzo, Report to
the Hum. Rs. Comm "n: Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Second Decade to
Combat Racism and Race Discriminationat 24, 8 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/78/Add.1, U.N. Sales
No. E.95.10167 (1995).
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2.

Jurisprudenceof the European Court of Human Rights Highlights
the Contours of the InternationalNondiscriminationNorm

Although certainly not binding on the United States, decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights are an invaluable source of
international human rights jurisprudence. The European Court is
especially significant because it has been interpreting fundamental
human rights norms under the European Convention for nearly forty
years. Like the Optional Protocol of the Covenant,32 the European
Convention provides a mechanism of individual petition for persons who
believe that their Convention rights have been violated-first to the
European Commission of Human Rights and then to the European Court
of Human Rights.33 Unlike the decisions of the Human Rights
Committee, however, decisions of the European Court are binding on
state parties to the Convention. 4
The court's long and rich human rights jurisprudence is especially
valuable for its interpretations of fundamental human rights guarantees
common to the European Convention, the International Covenant, and
other instruments. The European Court's jurisprudence in this area has
influenced a number of cases undertaken by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee. " As international law
becomes more prominent in a variety of areas, including trade,
environmental protection, and human rights, the decisions of
international tribunals charged with interpreting certain common
provisions will become more important. At the very least, such
jurisprudence is useful as an interpretive tool and may be persuasive
support for a particular interpretation of a human rights guarantee.
The nondiscrimination article of the European Convention closely
parallels the guarantee of the Covenant. Specifically, article 14 of the
European Convention provides that:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
32. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
33. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 25.
34. Id.art. 53.
35. See, e.g., Advisory Op. No. 4, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 43, OEA/ser. L./V/1I.10, doc. 13 (1984)
(concerning proposed amendments to naturalization provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica);
Advisory Op. No. 8, 1987 Y.B. Inter-Am. on H.R. (Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R.) 750. See generally J.G.
Merrills, The Development of InternationalLaw by the European Court of Human Rights 16-21
(1993) (discussing European Court's influence on international law).
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opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.36
As is clear from the language of the article as well as from the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting it,3 7
this nondiscrimination article is quite similar to the guarantee set forth in
the Covenant's article 2(1). 31 The article also possesses some of the
autonomy of the Covenant's article 26, because the European Court has
suggested that it will attach whenever there is discrimination that does
not have a reasonable justification even if there is otherwise no violation
of a Convention right.39 Because of these similarities and the
considerable body of jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights concerning the article, the court's rulings are particularly helpful
for interpreting the nondiscrimination guarantee of the Covenant. Indeed,
the Human Rights Committee endorsed this approach in its General
Comment on nondiscrimination, in which it drew directly from the
language of the European Court's decisions.4"
The European Court has held that a distinction is disc:riminatory if it
has no "objective and reasonable" justification-that is, if it does not
pursue a "legitimate aim" or demonstrate a "reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aira sought to be
realized."' In the article's application, the element of proportionality is
often a deciding factor. In many cases, the court finds that an aim is
justified but that the means employed are not proportionate.42 In
36. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 14.
37. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Austria, 255 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993); Inze v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1987); Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985); Marckx v.
Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979); Belgian Linguistics Case (No. 2), 6 Eur. Ct. H.1R (ser. A)
(1968).
38. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
39. For article 14 to apply, the claim of discrimination must fall within the "ambit" of one of the
Convention's other articles. Complementing the Convention's other normative protections, the
nondiscrimination guarantee must be read in conjunction with them. Its application does not,
however, require that a violation of another article has actually occurred and in this sense, article 14
is autonomous. lnze, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17, 36. Hence, "[t]he notion of discrimination within the
article includes in general cases where aperson or group is treated, without proper justification, less
favourably than another, even though the more favourable treatment is not called for by the
Convention." Abdulaziz, 94 Eur. Ct H.R. at 39, 82.
40. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Marckx, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16, 33.
42. Abdulaziz, 94 Eur. Ct H.R. at 38, 78 (stating that aim of protecting domestic labor market is
justified, but means not proportionate, because resulted in discrimination against women wishing to
bring alien spouse into country; stating that because equality of sexes is "major goal" of European
Community, "very weighty reasons" are needed to justify such distinction based on sex). In another
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determining proportionality, the court allows for a certain "margin of
appreciation" to be accorded to State action. Like a standard of
deference, its scope will vary "according to the circumstances, the
subject-matter and its background."43 The court has granted considerable
leeway to States in matters concerning "national security," for example,
but has been much less deferential to a State's economic and public order
concerns.4
3.

BriefSummary of U.S. Law RegardingAlienageDiscrimination

a.

FederalDiscriminationon the Basis ofAlienage

The constitutional validity of discrimination on the basis of alienage
depends on who is acting and in what arena. Essentially, when the
federal government discriminates, courts look for a "rational basis" for
the action.45 As part of the federal government's broad powers over
immigration and naturalization, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a
corresponding federal right to distinguish among aliens that is not shared
by the states.46 In short, the reasons for granting deference to federal
action regarding aliens, including for example, matters of national
sovereignty and "self-definition,"47 simply are not present when
individual states are acting. In addition, permitting each state to devise its
own scheme regarding the status of aliens would result in inconsistency
and interfere with the federal government's obligation to comply with
international standards for the treatment of aliens.4 8

case, the aim was legitimate (protection of health and welfare of children), but the means were not
proportionate (distinction based solely on religion). Hoffinann v. Austria, 255 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 60, 36 (1993).
43. Abdulaziz, 94 Eur. Ct. H.L at 37, 78.
44. See P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practiceof the European Convention on
Human Rights 583-607 (1990) (discussing danger that margin of appreciation could eviscerate
content of article 14).
45. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (applying rational-basis review to federal action
discriminating on basis of alienage in determining eligibility for federal public benefits; stating that
federal government may "take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and
this country"). But see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1976) (denying such
deference to Civil Service Commission's exclusion of resident aliens from federal civil service).
46. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84-87.
47. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 Va. J.
Int'l L. 201,203 (1994).
48. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69 (1941) ("Numerous treaties, in return for
reciprocal promises from other governments, have pledged the solemn obligation of this nation to the
end that aliens residing in our territory shall not be singled out for discriminatory burdens.").
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State Discriminationand Equal Protection

State discrimination on the basis of alienage is accorded the
deferential "rational basis" standard of review only when the so-called
"political function" exception applies.49 If this exception does not apply,
state discrimination against legal aliens that implicates a state's
economic, rather than "sovereignty," concerns is subject to "strict
scrutiny."50 In Graham v. Richardson, the U.S. Supreme Court found
invalid state public assistance statutes that limited eligibility on the basis
of alienage.5 The Court noted that "classifications based on alienage,
like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject
' State law classifications on the basis of
to close judicial scrutiny."52
alienage in eligibility determinations for the receipt of public benefits are
thus "presumptively invidious" and subject to strict scrutiny. To
withstand strict scrutiny, the classification must be related to a
"compelling government interest."53 An interest in preserving the state's
fisc almost never is sufficient.54
State discrimination against undocumented aliens warrants a less
stringent review, but still may require a state to demonstrate more than a
rational basis for such action. Considering state legislation that would
deny public elementary education to undocumented childrhen in Plyler v.
Doe,55 the U.S. Supreme Court employed a kind of intermediate review.
Although the Court did not find undocumented persons in general to be a
suspect class or education quite a fundamental right, it employed this
heightened standard of review because of the quasi-fundamental nature
of the right at stake-education 56 -and the innocence of the class49. The "political function exception" permits states to discriminate against aliens in hiring for
jobs that are somehow related to state governance. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 7374 (1979) ("[S]ome state functions are so bound ap with the operation of the Stale as a governmental
entity as to permit the exclusion from those functions of all persons who have not become part of the
process of self-government.").
50. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that states cannot discriminate
on basis of alienage in provision of general assistance benefits); see also Barannikova v. Town of
Greenwich, 643 A.2d 251, 263 (Conn. 1994) (holding that state cannot apply federal sponsordeeming rules to alien's application for state benefits).
51. 403 U.S. at376.
52. Id.at 372.
53. Id. at 376.
54. A state therefore has no "special public interest" in tax revenues to which aliens have
contributed on an equal basis with other state residents. Id.
55. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (striking down Texas statute that prohibited undocumented children
from attending state public schools).
56. Id. at 221.
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children." Given these emphases, it is unlikely that this standard would
be applied to discrimination against undocumented adults in the
provision of other public benefits.
c.

State Discriminationand FederalPreemption

In addition to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny, state alienage
discrimination may be preempted by the exclusive federal control of
matters concerning immigration and alienage.5 8 In Graham, Justice
Blackmun acknowledged the importance of the potential for preemption
when he noted that "[s]tate laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for
welfare benefits merely because of their alienage conflict with these
overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the
Federal Government." 9 The preemption argument also has come to the
fore in the Proposition 187 litigation, in which Judge Pfaelzer found
most of the proposition's provisions to be impermissible state attempts to
regulate immigration and, hence, preempted.6
In light of this broad federal preemptive power in matters of
immigration and alienage, a relevant question is whether congressional
authorization of state alienage discrimination may effectively shield such
state action from Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. The case law offers
conflicting replies to this question, particularly regarding state
discrimination aimed at legal residents. The Graham Court suggested
that congressional authorization will not insulate state action from
Fourteenth Amendment review because:
Although the Federal Government admittedly has broad
constitutional power to determine what aliens shall be admitted to
the United States, the period they may remain, and the terms and

57. Id. at 226.
58. Many scholars have suggested that questions of immigration (such as matters of entry and
exclusion) ought to be considered separately from those of alienage (such as matters of "equal
personhood" of those within a country's jurisdiction), removing alienage from the realm of the
federal plenary power over immigration. See, e.g., Linda S.Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the
Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1047 (1994); see also Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal,
Limits of Citizenship 154-55 (1994) (proposing post-national model of societal membership that
would recast membership rights in terms of human rights and "equal personhood," in place of
nationality and citizenship). Although these arguments are persuasive, this Comment presumes that
the two categories remain blurred and that, when it comes to aliens, federal action will receive
greater deference than state action.
59. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971).
60. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 768-87 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(engaging exclusively in preemption analysis and making no mention of equal protection as factor).
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conditions of their naturalization, Congress does not have the
power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal
ProtectionClause.61
In Plyler v. Doe, on the other hand, the Court noted that states do have
"some authority" to take action toward undocumented immigrants that
"mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal., 62 The
Court also stated in dictum that "if the Federal Government has by
uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for
the treatment of an alien subclass, the States may, of course, follow the
federal direction."63 When Connecticut advanced this reasoning to justify
its application of federal guidelines regarding spon: or-deeming, 4
resulting in denial of state-funded assistance to a legal permanent
resident, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court found the Plyler
dictum inapplicable. 65 Because Plyler did not involve a statute in which
the federal government had authorized the "disparate treatment of
resident aliens," its dictum on the matter could not be considered
controlling in such a case.66
4.

Using the InternationalNondiscriminationNorm To Inzterpret the
EqualProtectionGuaranteeof the FourteenthAmendnent

Using an international human rights norm to interpret die content of
an important constitutional guarantee is admittedly a controversial
enterprise.'
To simplify, the primary debate occurs between
"interpretivists"
and "non-interpretivists."
The "interpretivist"
adjudication involves making a determination of constitutonality based
on the values the original Framers intended to enshrine in the
Constitution, ascertained by reference to the text of the Constitution and

61. 403 U.S. at 382 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Barannikova v. Town of
Greenwich, 643 A.2d 251,261-62 (Conn. 1994) ("The fact that a state may act within a given realm
provided it does not conflict with federal legislation, does not also imply that when so acting it may
make invidious distinctions without regard to the constitutional equal protection guarantee.").
62. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).
63. Id. at219 n.19.
64. "Sponsor-deeming" is a process by which a sponsor's income is "deemed" to be available to
the alien for the purposes of determining eligibility for benefits.
65. Barannikova,643 A.2d at 262-63.

66. Id.
67. The controversy surrounding such an approach is an enormous topic, see, e.g., Michael J.
Perry, The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights (1982), and is beyond the scope of this
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other historical documents.6" The "non-interpretivist" camp, on the other
hand, determines constitutionality by reference to value judgments
outside the text of the Constitution and other than those envisioned by
Using the international human rights norm of
the Framers.
nondiscrimination to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment is an example
of the non-interpretivist approach.
Although debates regarding theories of constitutional adjudication
remain contentious, the non-interpretivist approach is applied commonly
and is represented amply in constitutional case law. In the early civil
rights cases, for example, advocates consistently argued for incorporating
norms from the newly ratified UN Charter in the courts' understandings
of constitutional guarantees.7" In particular, civil rights advocates urged
that the broader scope of the international nondiscrimination norm be
used to interpret the bounds of the equal protection guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment, seeking to expand its application to encompass
racial segregation. Thus, a scholar has argued that, although seldom
explicitly mentioned by the courts, the content of the international human
rights norms contained in the UN Charter played a seldom acknowledged
role in shaping early civil rights jurisprudence in the United States.7' In a
time of evolving international human rights guarantees and protection
mechanisms, this approach is essential to ensure that the United States
keeps pace with its international obligations and maintains its reputation
as one of the most effective guarantors of individual liberties and
fundamental human rights.
B.

InternationalProtection ofFamily Life and Family Unity

In addition to violating international nondiscrimination norms,
proposals that would permit states to discriminate on the basis of
alienage in crafting public benefits eligibility criteria conflict with
international human rights guarantees pertaining to family life. Unlike
the nondiscrimination norm, which can be used to interpret the equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no clear
constitutional parallel to the international right to family privacy and
unity. Nonetheless, in ratifying the Covenant, the United States has

68. Id. at 10-11.
69. Id. at 11.
70. Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The UnitedNationsCharterand United States Civil Rights Litigation:
1946-1955, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 901 (1984).
at 948.
71. IdM
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agreed to adhere to international standards regarding the protection of
family life. Like the nondiscrimination norm, these family life guarantees
are clarified by jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
1.

Protectionof FamilyLife Under the InternationalCovenant

Like many other international human rights instruments,7 2 the
Covenant guarantees certain protections for the family. One such
protection appears in article 23(1) where the Covenant states that "[t]he
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled
to protection by society and the State."'73 In article 17(1), the Covenant
protects every person against "arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence... [and] unlawful attacks on
his honour and reputation." The protection of family life i;s of particular
relevance to aliens, both in matters of entry and expulsion, as well as in
the conditions of residence.7 Elaborating on the meauing of this
guarantee, the Human Rights Committee stated that the term "unlawful"
means that "[i]nterference authorized by States can only take place on the
basis of law, which itself must comply with the provisions, aims and
objectives of the Covenant."75 As for the article's protection against
"arbitrary" interference with privacy and family life, tl..e Committee
notes that this protection can "extend to interference provided for under
the law... [and] is intended to guarantee that even interference provided
for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and
objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the
'
particular circumstances."76
The Human Rights Committee, considering the application of these
protections to aliens, noted that although the Covenant does not
recognize a right of an alien to enter or to reside in a particular state, "in
certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant
even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when considerations
72. See, e.g., International Convention On the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, art. 44(1), G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doe.
A/RES/45/158 (1990); Child Convention, supra note 18, art. 9(1); American Convention on Human
Rights, art. 17(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 36 O.A.S.T.S. 1; ICESCR, supra note 18, art. 10; European
Convention, supra note 17, art. 8; UDHR, supranote 18, art. 16(3).
73. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 23(1)
74. See generally Louis B. Sohn & Thomas Buergenthal, The Movement of Persons Across
Borders 65-71 (1992) (discussing treatment of aliens under international human rights instruments
protecting family life and family unity).
75. HRJIGEN, supra note 21, at 20, 3.
76. Id. at 20, 4.
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of nondiscrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respectfor
' In accord with this statement,
family life arise."77
the Committee also
noted in its comment on article 23 that:
[T]he right to found a family implies, in principle, the possibility to
procreate and live together... [and this] implies the adoption of
appropriate measures, both at the internal level and as the case may
be, in cooperation with other States, to ensure the unity or
reunification of families, particularly when their members are
separated for political, economic or similar reasons.7"
In one of its decisions, the Committee articulated the application of
article 17 to immigration matters. Considering a state's immigration laws
that prevented women from bringing their alien husbands into the
country, the Committee observed that:
[T]he exclusion of a person from a country where close members of
his family are living can amount to an interference within the
meaning of Article 17. . . . [Whether the immigration laws are]
compatible with the Covenant depends on whether such
interference is either 'arbitrary or unlawful' as stated in Article
17(1), or conflicts in any other way with the State party's
obligations under the Covenant.79
In this instance, the Committee found that "[i]n the present cases, not
only the future possibility of deportation but the existing precarious
residence situation of foreign husbands in Mauritius represents ... an
interference ... with the family life of the Mauritian wives and their
husbands."" Like the European Court,8 ' the Committee also allowed the
State a considerable "margin of appreciation," observing that "the legal
protections ... a State can afford to the family may vary from country to
country and depend on different social, economic, political and cultural
conditions and traditions." 2 The Committee ultimately found it
unnecessary to determine whether there had been interference with
family life, because it found that the law had a discriminatory effect on

77. Id. at 18, 5 (emphasis added) (concerning General Comment 15 regarding "[t]he position of
aliens under the Covenant").
78. Id. at 28-29, 5.
79. See Mauritian Women Case, supra note 28, 9.2(b)(2)(i)(2).
80. Id. 9.2(b)(2)(i)(3).
8 1. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
82. Mauritian Women Case, supra note 28,

9.2(b)2(ii)(1).
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the basis
of gender in violation of article 26 and was invalid for that
83
reason.
2.

Respectfor Family Life Under the European Convention

The European Convention's protection of family life is similar to that
provided under the Covenant. The European Convention guarantees
"respect for family life" in article 8, which provides that:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference
by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of heath or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.8 4
Significantly, the European Court of Human Rights sees this
protection as having both a positive and negative component. In other
words, article 8 "does not merely compel the State to abstain from such
interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may
be positive obligations inherent in an effective 'respect' for family life."8"
States are therefore required to "act in a manner calculated to allow these
ties to develop normally."86
The European Court has a particularly robust tradition of interpreting
the content of this "respect for family life" with regard to aliens' entry
and expulsion from European states. 7 Like the Human Rights
Committee, 8 the court emphasizes that no alien has a right to enter or
reside in a particular country or a right not to be expelled but
acknowledges that the expulsion or refusal of entry of persons from or to
a country in which their immediate family is resident may violate article
83. For example, Mauritian males who wished to bring their spouses were not similarly affected.
84. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 8.
85. Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15, 31 (1979).
86. Id. at21, 45.

87. See, e.g., Lamguindaz v. The United Kingdom, 258-C Eur. Ct H.R. (ser. A) (1993);
Moustaquim v. Belgium, 193 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991); Djeroud v. France, 191 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1991); Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); Abdulaziz v. United
Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985). Lamguindaz and Deroud reached riendly settlement

with the state party so references are to the decisions of the European Commission on Human
Rights.
88. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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8." Whether the case involves the attempted expulsion of a long-time
resident "criminal" alien90 or alien divorced from a national with whom
he had a child91 or the denial of entry to alien spouses,92 the court's
reasoning is consistent.
As a threshold matter, the European Court determines whether there is
a genuine family connection. As broadly interpreted by the court, family
life includes at least the "ties between near relatives," such as
grandparents and grandchildren.93 Extending the Convention's
conception of "family life" beyond the bounds of the nuclear family, the
court considers a number of factors to determine whether sufficiently
close ties exist, including economic interdependence, and whether the
household is shared.94 Once a real and close family tie is found, the court
examines whether a given interference with family life was "'in
accordance with the law'; had an aim or aims that is or are legitimate
under article 8(2) and was 'necessary in a democratic society' for the
aforesaid aim or aims."" In many cases, the state action will easily clear
the first two hurdles-for example, being lawful under the state's
immigration laws and having a legitimate aim of protecting the public
order (especially for criminal aliens) or labor market-but will founder
on the "necessary in a democratic society" requirement. The court
interprets this "necessity" as being both responsive to a "pressing social
need" and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.96
As in the discrimination context, it is often the issue of proportionality
upon which a given State action fails.97 The court considers a number of
factors implicated in a proposed expulsion or denial of entry, including
89. See, e.g., Lamguindaz, 258-C Eur. Ct. H.R. at 100, 36.
90. See, e.g., Lamguindaz, 258-C Eur. Ct. H.R. at 102, 45; Moustaquim, 193 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8,

9, 10; Djeroud, 191 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 28, 8.
91. See, e.g., Berrehab, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8, 9.
92. See, e.g., Abdulaziz, 94 Eur. CL H.R. at 10, 10.
93. Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1979). In fact, the scope of "family life"
has been interpreted quite broadly by the Court and may include a parent's relationship with an
illegitimate child, a child's relationship with a non-custodial parent, polygamous and extra-marital
relationships, and other "close family ties." See van Dijk & van Hoof, supra note 44, at 378-79.
94. van Dijk & van Hoof, supra note 44, at 378-80. In the case of a non-custodial parent's
relationship with his child, for instance, the court considered the parent's right of access to the child
and contribution to her education as sufficient to constitute "family life." See Berrehab, 138 Eur. CL
H... at 13, 20.

95. Lamguindaz v. United Kingdom, 258-C Eur. Ct. H.. (ser. A) at 101,
138 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15-16, 28.

39 (1993); Berrehab,

96. Lamguindaz,258-C Eur. Ct. H.R. at 101-02, n 42-43.

97. See, e.g., id at 102, 48; Berrehab, 138 Eur. Ct. HR. at 16, 29.
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how long the individual has lived in the country, the nature of her family
and economic ties there, and the ease with which the rest of the family
could be expected to follow her to another country.98 The court then
weighs the interests of the individual against those of the community and
frequently finds that the proposed action is disallowed because its effects
on the individual are out of proportion with the legitimate aims pursued.
a.

IllegalImmigrants Also Are GrantedFamilyLife Protections

The protections of article 8 extend also to undocumented immigrants
who have demonstrable family ties in a country. This aspect of the
article's protection is expressed in some recent rulings of the domestic
courts of several European Convention countries. Although the nature of
these decisions may seem quite out of step with the immigration policy
trends in the United States,99 such decisions are nonetheless instructive
because U.S. obligations under the International Covenant mirror the
obligations of state parties under the European Convention.'
Citing article 8, European courts consistently hold that an illegal
immigrant's interest in family unity outweighs a State's interest in
enforcing its immigration laws and protecting the "publ:.c order." For
example, a Finnish court recently revoked an expulsion order issued
against a family of illegal immigrants, noting the family's demonstrated
ties with Finland and that their sick child was benefiting from a healthy
diet available there."0 ' The same court found a violation of article 8 in the
attempted expulsion of a Russian homosexual who was in the country
illegally.'0 2 Noting his domestic partnership with a Finn, the court
deemed the proposed expulsion an interference with the couple's
"private life" and, hence, prohibited by article 8. In a similar vein, the
98. van Dijk & van Hoof, supranote 44, at 386-89.
99. See, e.g., U.S. Comm'n on Immigration Reform, Legal Immigration: Setting Priorities,A
Report to Congress 10-20 (1995) (proposing new limits and restrictions on faaily visas for legal
immigrants).
100. For example, article 2(1) of the International Covenant requires state paities to endeavor to
ensure to all persons in their jurisdiction the rights of the Covenant and article 2(2) requires that they
"adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized
in the present Covenant." ICCPR, supra note 14. arts. 2(l), 2(2). In the same way, article 1 of the
European Convention requires States to ensure that their domestic law is compatible with the
Convention and article 13 requires States to provide a remedy to any person whose Convention
rights have been violated. European Convention, supra note 17, arts. 1, 15.
101. X v. Finland, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Conv.on H.P. (Sup. Admin. Ct.) 497.
102. X v. Finland, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. (Sup. Admin. Ct.) 499. Tlhe other part of the
decision rested on the fact that, as a homosexual, lie might face inhuman or degrading treatment if he
were returned to Russia.
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Constitutional Court of Austria found that immigration authorities had
failed to engage in the balancing necessary under article 8.13 In this case,
a Nigerian, married to an Austrian, was denied a visa based on his threat
to public order and safety."w Finding that the authorities had failed to
weigh the interests of the individual in maintaining his family life against
the general interests of the community in public safety, the court
invalidated the visa-denial under article 8.1"5
II.

APPLYING THE INTERNATIONAL NORM IN THE
DOMESTIC CONTEXT

A.

The InternationalNondiscriminationNorm Containedin the
InternationalCovenant Is the Supreme Law of the Land

Although there is considerable debate about whether the Covenant is
self-executing, as a treaty signed and ratified by the United States the
Covenant is the supreme law of the land," 6 displacing conflicting state
law and earlier federal law. 7 Treaties maintain their "supreme" status
regardless of whether they are self-executing or not.'0 8 Courts have long
held that Congress may pass legislation in violation of a treaty. 9
Mitigating Congress' license to break international law is the standard
canon of statutory construction requiring that legislation not be
interpreted as inconsistent with treaties unless no other interpretation is
possible."' When violating international law, therefore, Congress must
be explicit."' The fact that Congress has breached international norms in
the past without being clear about its intentions does not eliminate this

103. X v. Austria, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. (Const. Ct.) 487-88.
104. Id.
105. Id.

106. See U.S. Const. art. VI.
107. See, e.g., Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (noting that between treaty and
conflicting federal statute, that which is later in time controls).
108. Self-executing treaties are those immediately enforceable by the courts, whereas non-selfexecuting treaties require congressional action before enforcement.
109. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 723-24 (1893) (holding that
Congress has authority to pass laws that deny individuals rights guaranteed under treaty).
110. Joan Fitzpatrick & William McKay Bennett, A Lion in the Path? The Influence of
InternationalLmv on the ImmigrationPolicy ofthe United States, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 589, 592 (1995)
(citing Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
111. Id. at593.
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requirement. It remains the duty of the courts to prevent the political
branches from heedlessly disregarding international law.1 '
The Covenant supports a private right of action, despite some
authority to the contrary." 3 In ratifying the Covenant, the Senate attached
a "declaration," purporting to make the treaty's first twenty-seven
articles non-self-executing.' In light of this declaration, some courts
have summarily concluded that the Covenant does not support a "private
right of action."' 15 This view has been challenged, however, as has the

very efficacy of the Senate's declaration.

6

Unlike a reservation, which

is incorporated in the treaty itself, a declaration arguably never becomes
a part of the treaty and, hence, is not binding as law.' 17 Also, under
established precedent, the courts are to decide whether or not a treaty is
self-executing." 8 Even if the declaration were to be considered a
definitive expression of non-self-execution, the Covenant's protections
112. Id. at 627 (noting that political branches have often breached international norms in
immigration arena and observing "[tihat the political branches of the federal government may
consciously choose, without domestic legal consequence, to abrogate the nation's international
obligations is perhaps an inescapable reality after the Chinese Exclusion Case. That contemporary
policymakers should be permitted by the courts to do so unconsciously or cavalierly is not
unavoidable.") (citation omitted).
113. See, e.g., Igartua de laRosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cin:1994) (stating that
because articles one through 27 of Covenant are non-self-executing, they do not give rise to privately
enforceable rights; rejecting plaintiffs' attempt to use Covenant to override constitutional
provisions), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1426 (1995).
114. See 138 Cong. Rec. S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
115. See, e.g., Igartuade la Rosa, 32 F.3d at 10 n.1.
116. See Manuel Carlos Vazquez,The FourDoctrines ofSelf-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. L Int'l
L. 695, 723 (1995) (arguing that "private right of action" issue is distinct from self-execution
question and courts must determine whether or not treaty is self-executing, thereby fulfilling "central
role that the Constitution assigns to them in the enforcement of treaties"); see also John Quigley, The
InternationalCovenant on Civil andPoliticalRights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DePaul L. Rev.
1287, 1309 (1993) (urging courts to apply "traditional jurisprudence on self-execution to find that
the Covenant is the 'law of the land' in the United States").
117. Quigley, supra note 116, at 1301-03 (noting that if declaration is valid and binding on
courts, it would place United States in violation of Covenant itself; stating, for ,example, that article
2(3) requires that every person whose rights under Covenant are violated shall have some remedy
and "that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto detennined by competent
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by
the legal system of the State . . . [and that States should] develop the possibilities of judicial
remedy."); see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control
over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 571, 590 (1991) (arguing that
Senate pronouncements that are inconsistent with international law are also invalid under U.S. law).
118. See Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829); see also Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations § 154(1) (1987) ("Whether an international agreement of the United
States is or is not self-executing is finally determined as a matter of interpretation by courts in the
United States if the issue arises in litigation.").

1114

Welfare Reform and Discrimination Against Immigrants
still could be invoked defensively in U.S. courts." 9 Such protections
under the Covenant also could be used to construe and interpret
constitutional provisions, making the Constitution itself the source of
law, rather than the treaty. 2 '
Most importantly, non-self-executing treaties are still the law of the
land, preempting conflicting state law, because they express a "nationalpolicy" binding on the states.' The U.S. Supreme Court long has held
that the international obligations undertaken by the President and the
Senate in signing and ratifying treaties supersede conflicting state
laws." The provisions of the International Covenant, therefore, preempt
conflicting state laws." Accordingly, the federal government is obliged
to ensure that the states do not violate treaties or customary international
law.' Just as Congress must be explicit when it chooses to violate

international law, so too must it be equally clear in authorizing the states
to act contrary to international law."z Lacking this clarity, congressional
119. Vazquez, supranote 116, at 720.
120. This approach is suggested in a number of law review articles. See, e.g., Gordon A.
Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process andEqual ProtectionAnalyses, 52 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 3, 19 (1983); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and InternationalJudicial Protection of
IndividualRights: A ComparativeLegal ProcessAnalysis and ProposedSynthesis, 41 Hastings L. J.
805, 838-41 (1990); see also ConsiderationofReports Submitted by States PartiesunderArticle 40
ofthe Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 50 at 3, para. 11 (1995) [hereinafter Article 40 reports]
(evidencing Human Rights Committee's acknowledgment of this well-accepted role:
"[N]otwithstanding the non-self-executing declaration of the United States, courts of the United
States are not prevented from seeking guidance from the Covenant in interpreting United States
law").
121. Fitzpatrick & Bennett, supra note I10, at 591 (citing Louis Henkin, The Constitution and
UnitedStates Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853,
866-67 (1987)); see also ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 50 (stating that "[t]he provisions of the present
Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions").
122. Joan Fitzpatrick, The Preemptiveand InterpretiveForce ofInternationalHuman Rights Lav
in State Courts, 90 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. (forthcoming 1996) (on file with Washington Law
Review). Fitzpatrick states:
As the Supreme Court noted in preempting California's attempt in the 1870s to exclude Chinese
women suspected of prostitution, it is the national government and not the state that is held
accountable for the breach of treaty obligations stemming from the state's oppressive actions.
Where the President and the Senate have solemnly committed the nation to substantive
provisions of human rights treaties, national policy should preempt conflicting state rules.
Id. (citations omitted).
123. Lea Brilmayer, Federalism,State Authority, and the Preemptive Power ofInternationalLaw,
1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 295, 334 (1995) (asserting that international law is federal law and preempts
contrary state law).
124. Id. at 335.
125. Id. at 336 (finding parallel in Commerce Clause context, in which Congress authorizes states
to adopt legislation that would otherwise violate Commerce Clause, and in regulation of insurance,
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authorization of state alienage discrimination contained in the welfare
reform legislation 2 6 does not effectively sanction state violation of
international law. Because the legislation neither mentions U.S. treaty
obligations nor expresses an intent to abrogate them, its provisions that
are contrary to the International Covenant must be invalid.
1.

States Have a Positive ObligationTo Implement the Covenant's
Guarantees

In addition to the preemption consideration, the states have an
affirmative duty to safeguard the individual rights guaranteed in the
Covenant. The Human Rights Committee recognizes states as key
players in guaranteeing for individuals in the United States the rights set
forth in the Covenant. Emphasizing the International Covenant's
application to the states, the Committee recognized the federal
government's "readiness ... to take such further measures as may be
necessary to ensure that the States of the Union implement the rights
guaranteed by the Covenant"' 27 and noted its "satisfaction [with] the
assurances of the Government that its declaration regarding the federal
system is not a reservation and is not intended to affect the international
obligations of the United States."'2 8 The Committee also addressed the
matter of discrimination by states when it recommended that "[s]tate
legislation which is not yet in full compliance with the nondiscrimination
articles of the Covenant should be brought systematically into line with
129
them as soon as possible.'
In fact, the U.S. "understanding" regarding federalism can be read as
an expression of the affirmative obligation of the states to implement the
provisions of the Covenant. 30 This is consistent with the language of the
Supremacy Clause itself, which directs "Judges in every State" to ensure
the operation of treaties, "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
"[s]ince Congress can violate international law so long as it does so clearly, the states also may
violate international law so long as Congress lias clearly authorized such violations") (emphasis
added).
126. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 411, 110 Stat. 2105, 2268.
127. Article 40 Reports, supranote 120, at 2, 'g9.
128. Id. at 3, 12. The "understanding" stated that the Covenant will be implemented by the
federal government "to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the
matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments." 138 Cong. Rec. at S4784
(daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
129. Article 40 Reports, supranote 120, at 5, 'J30.
130. Fitzpatrick, supra note 122.
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State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 3 ' The understanding thus can be
read as an invitation to state authorities: (1) to provide appropriate state
remedies for self-executing treaty norms; (2) to assess potential
preemption of state norms by federal policy embodied in non-selfexecuting treaties; (3) to absorb international human rights norms into
the common-law-making enterprise; and (4) to turn to international law
benchmarks in interpreting both state constitutions and statutes.'
At the very least, state legislators must strive not to violate U.S. treaty
obligations as they shape state law and policy.
2.

The InternationalNondiscriminationNorm Requires a Rigorous
Form ofIntermediateReview

Coupling the article 14 tests from the European Court's jurisprudence
with the Human Rights Committee's interpretations of nondiscrimination
and the significant protections afforded to aliens under the International
Covenant reveals a rigorous standard of scrutiny applicable to alienage
discrimination. The requisite international tests of proportionality and
progressive interpretation of the norm result in a standard far beyond
"rational-basis" review. In the international context, the justifications that
a State must produce in order to show that its aims are legitimate and
carried out in a proportional manner recall the "compelling government
interest" standard of "strict scrutiny." At the very least, then, the
international standard suggests a stringent form of intermediate review.
In contrast to equal protection jurisprudence under the Constitution,
with its various levels of scrutiny, the European Court has not articulated
specific standards that should be applied to different types of
discrimination. It is possible, however, to discern certain trends in the
court's jurisprudence that suggest the level of scrutiny imposed. In all
instances of discrimination, the court applies the two-pronged test of
"legitimate aim" and "reasonable relationship of proportionality"
between the aim and the means employed. The court has stated that the
reasonable relationship of proportionality between means and ends must
be established clearly and that the question of proportionality is to be
considered separately from that of the legitimate aim.' The court's cases
further reveal that proportionality is to be measured as the "fair balance"
to be struck between the protection of the "general interest of the
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Belgian Linguistics Case, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34,

10 (1968).
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community"
and the respect due to the individual's fundamental human
4

rights.

13

In addition to this balancing test for proportionality, the scope of the
"margin of appreciation" will also effect the scrutiny accorded a given
act of discrimination. Although it may be used to grant Siates discretion
to discriminate, the margin is generally not applied to that end. In fact, in
determining the margin of appreciation that applies to a given state
action, the court considers as one of the relevant factors the "existence or
non-existence of common ground" with the laws of other States who are
parties to the European Convention.' In addition, article 14 is to be
interpreted in a progressive way, in keeping with the rights reflected in
other international instruments. 136 Although such instruments may not
have been ratified by an allegedly discriminating state party, the
individual rights guaranteed in widely-accepted human rights
instruments ought to prevail.' 37 In this way, an individual State's margin
of appreciation may be quite circumscribed.
3.

Applying the InternationalNorm s Heightened Stand2rdofReview
to State Discrimination

Although the Senate added an "understanding" regarding
nondiscrimination when ratifying the Covenant, stating that distinctions
are to be permitted when they are "at minimum, rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective,""13 discriminatory actions by both
federal and state actors in the United States ought to be subject to review
under the international norm's higher standard of scrutiny. Adopting this
view, the Human Rights Committee noted "with satisfaction" that this
"understanding" indicates that the United States will not permit
"distinctions that would not be legitimate under the Covenant."' 39 In spite
of the Senate's "understanding," therefore, the United States and its
constituent units are bound by the application of the nordiscrimination
guarantee to the same extent as other state parties.

134. Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16,

27-29 (1988).

135. Rasmussen v. Denmark, 87 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15, 40 (1984).

136. See Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37-39,

78-80 (1988)

(stating that because equality of sexes is "major goal" of European Community, it is particularly
difficult to justify distinctions on basis of sex).
137. Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.1L (ser. A) at 19-20, 41 (1979).
138. 138 Cong. Rec. at S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (emphasis added).
139. Article 40 Reports, supra note 120, at 3, IJ10.
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a.

States Acting on Their Own Initiative:LegalImmigrants

State action that discriminates against legal immigrants in making
welfare eligibility determinations, 4 ' undertaken without congressional
authorization, currently is subject to strict scrutiny under Graham v.
Richardson.4' Application of the international norm's demanding
standard reaffirms that holding. The Washington Senate Bill that
proposed making all "non-citizens" ineligible for nearly all forms of
public assistance, for example, aimed to ensure that "new immigrants to
Washington state provide for themselves and their families."'42 Although
it is possible that this goal passes the preliminary "legitimate aim" test
necessary for the international norm's satisfaction, 43 the next component
of the test asks whether the distinction is based on "objective and
reasonable" criteria.'" With this requirement, state alienage
discrimination runs into difficulty. Because immigrants as a class have
been shown to generate as much as twenty-five billion dollars more than
they use in public benefits, 45 immigration status as a criterion for welfare
ineligibility is manifestly unreasonable. In fact, without some fiscal data
to support the state's interest in alien "self-reliance," the very legitimacy
of the original aim is questionable. For these reasons, such measures
should fail before
reaching the tests for "justification" or
146
"proportionality."'
b.

States Acting with CongressionalAuthorization: Legal Immigrants

State discrimination on the basis of alienage that is undertaken with
congressional authorization, 47 for which there is no binding precedent in
the domestic case law, is ripe for application of the international
standard. Under federal welfare reform's block-grant model, states have
the "option" to discriminate on the basis of alienage in determining
140.
141.
142.
143.

See, e.g., Wash. S. 6749, supra note 10.
403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); see supranotes 50-57 and accompanying text.
Wash. S. 6749, supranote 10.
A good argument certainly can be made that the aim does not constitute a purpose

"legitimate under the Covenant." See HRI/GEN, supra note 21, at 27, 13.
144. Id.
145. Michael Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight6
(1994).
146. See supranotes 25-27,41-44 and accompanying text.
147. For example, federal welfare reform declares that "a State is authorized to determine the
eligibility for any State public benefits of an alien who is a qualified alien," subject to a few limited
exceptions. § 412, 110 Stat. at 2268.
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eligibility for public benefits if sought to be justified by the "compelling
government interest" in enacting "new rules for eligibility and
sponsorship agreements in order to assure that aliens become selfreliant.' 14 Application of the more rigorous international standard first
requires a finding that this aim is legitimate. Clearing that hurdle,
proponents of such discrimination must demonstrate that it is based on
objective and reasonable criteria. As in the case of state-initiated
discrimination, proposals in the federal context similarly lack such
reasonable criteria. Without some evidence that the singling out of
immigration status as a basis for discriminating against legal residents
has some rational fiscal basis, such federally-sanctioned state action also
should fail.
An examination of state alienage discrimination in the provision of
basic health services illustrates the usefulness of the interrLational norm's
standard of review. If states exercise their "option" to disc:iminate on the
basis of alienage in the administration of Medicaid and other health
benefits, legal immigrants most likely will find themselves without
access to basic health services. The impact would be tremendous, for
instance, if Washington were to discriminate against legal immigrants in
administering its new Basic Health Plan'49 that provides low fee basic
health insurance to all Washington residents.
Although the right to health care is not enumerated in the Covenant,
the Covenant's companion instrument, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, explicitly guarantees this right, 50
as do a number of other international human rights instruments.'' Under
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right is,
however, subject to an important limitation. Article 2(3) states that
"[d]eveloping countries, with due regard to human rights and their
national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee
the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to nonnationals."' 5 2 In spite of this weakened nondiscrimination guarantee, the
148. § 400, 110 Stat. at 2260.
149. Basic Health Plan-Health Care Access Act, Wash. Rev. Code ch. 70.47 (1996).
150. See ICESCR, supra note 18, art. 12 ("Te States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health.").
151. See, e.g., Child Convention, supra note 18, art. 23; ICESCR, supra note 18, art. 12; UDHR,
supra note 18, art. 25.
152. This provision has been decried as "unconscionably vague" and "likely to cause invidious
and unreasonable distinctions to be made against aliens on the ground of their foreign nationality."
See Warwick McKean, Equality and Discrimination Under InternationalLaw 201 (1983); see also
Richard B. Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary InternationalLaw 48 (1984)
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Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights consistently has
found violations by non-developing
States who justify discrimination on
53
the basis of economic concerns.
Because the nondiscrimination norm of article 26 of the International
Covenant is neither limited to the rights set forth in that instrument nor to
the economic means of the state parties, its standard of review may be
applied to state alienage discrimination that impacts access to basic
health care. Denying such access to tax-paying legal residents, based
merely on their immigration status, betrays the unreasonableness of the
policy makers' criterion. In addition, the "compelling government
interest"'5 4 in the "self-reliance" of aliens must be weighed against the
essential interest of legal resident children and adults in having access to
some form of basic health services. In light of this interest and the faulty
criterion on which the discrimination is based, such state action is a clear
violation of the nondiscrimination guarantee of the International
Covenant. Unless Congress is explicit in sanctioning such a treaty
violation, it must fail. 5
c.

States Acting on Their Own Initiative:Illegal Immigrants

Because the domestic equal protection jurisprudence regarding
undocumented immigrants is so weak, particularly when it comes to
adults,'56 the international norm could have a dramatic effect on stateinitiated discrimination against undocumented immigrants in the
provision of basic social services, health care, and education.'57 As a
threshold matter, the international test acknowledges that such state
action is discrimination on the basis of "status." That is, "[m]easures

(drawing conclusion that ICESCR does not contain "general norm of non-discrimination" against

aliens.)
153. For example, members of the Committee found an Austrian policy of denying aliens
maternity benefits available to nationals to be impermissible discrimination under article 2. The
exception under article 2(3) did not apply, because Austria was by no means a "developing country."
See U.N. ESCOR, 2d. Sess., 4th mtg. at 8, 45, U.N. Doc. EIC.12/1988/SR.4 (1988); U.N. ESCOR,
2d Sess., 3rd mtg. at 4-5, 13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1988/SR.3 (1988). Similarly, Germany was called
to task for failing to provide social, health care, and education benefits to migrant workers and their
families on an equal footing with nationals. See U.N. ESCOR, Ist Sess., 12th mtg. at 5, 16, U.N.
Doc. EIC.12/1987/SR.12 (1987). See generally Matthew C. R. Craven, The InternationalCovenant
on Economic, Social and CulturalRights:A Perspective on its Development 172-74 (1995).
154. § 400, 110 Stat. at 2260.
155. See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., supra note 55 and accompanying text.
157. E.g., California Proposition 187, supra note 2; Washington Initiative 653, supranote 9.
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which specifically exclude aliens from access to basic human services
represent not border regulation but punishment for status; they impose a
penalty on a class of people by virtue their status under the immigration
laws."' 58 The test then asks whether the state's aims-for example, to
save money and to deter illegal immigrants from coming to the stateare legitimate. Assuming that these aims could be considered legitimate,
the validity of the measures again turns on whether the criteria employed
are objective and reasonable and the means proportional. For the
criterion of undocumented status to be objective and reasonable, some
proof that the availability of public benefits is a magnet for illegal
immigration is required.'59 Already, there are few public services for
which undocumented immigrants are eligible; e ° public education for
undocumented children probably constitutes the greatest expense for the
states. 6' In spite of this demonstrable cost, barring a class of individuals
from an important right like education requires extremely strong
justification.'6 2 The potential effects on the thousands of children forced
out of schools weigh heavily against a state's economic concerns. In
addition, the societal costs of such a measure never have been
calculated. 63 On the other hand, state costs for the provision of other
social and medical services to undocumented immigrants are much

158. Linda S. Bosniak, Immigrants,Preemptionand Equality, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 179, 188 (1994).
159. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism,and the Welfore State, 42 UCLA
L. Rev. 1453, 1465 (1995) (noting that there is no empirical evidence to support claim that
"significant numbers of persons immigrate to the United States for public benefits or welfare").
160. The few federal programs currently available to undocumented persons include WIC
(Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children), community and migrant
health centers, school lunch, and social service programs authorized under Title XX of the Social
Security Act. Under Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), states must provide public education to
undocumented children and under federal law state Medicaid programs must provide emergency
services (including childbirth) to all persons. 457 U.S. at 230.
161. According to an Urban Institute study, the cost to the seven states with the majority of
undocumented residents (Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Texas)
was $3.1 billion in fiscal year 1993. R. Clark et a]., Fiscal Impacts of Undocumented Aliens:
Selected Estimatesfor Seven States 11 (1994).
162. The right to education (especially primary, free, and compulsory) is guaranteed in a number
of instruments. See, e.g., Child Convention, supra note 18, art. 28 (1)(a); ICESCR, supra note 18,
art. 13; UDHR, supra note 18, art. 26. For a good discussion of the right to education in international
law, see Connie de Ia Vega, The Right to Equal Education: Merely a Guiding Principle or
Customary InternationalLegal Right?, 2 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 37 (1994). See also Stephen Knight,
Note, Proposition187 and InternationalHuman Rights Law: Illegal Discriminationin the Right to
Education, 19 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 18 (1995).
163. For example, consider the public safety effects of creating a class of idle and illiterate
children.
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lower." Contrasting this relatively low cost with the potential effect of
removing even the most basic human and health services available to
undocumented immigrants, 6 the balance tips toward the invalidity of
state discrimination.
d.

States Acting Under a FederalMandate:Illegal Immigrants

Under welfare reform legislation, states are prohibited from providing
any services to undocumented aliens (except for emergency medical
services and public education) unless they enact a state law that
"affirmatively provides for such eligibility."'" The articulated aim of this
prohibition is to "remove the incentives for illegal immigration provided
by the availability of public benefits."' 67 With federal authorization, this
immigration-control aim may be considered more legitimate than in the
case of state-initiated programs. Again, however, some link between
illegal immigration and the provision of the few available state benefits
must be shown. A strong argument can be made that denying access to
the most minimal human services to a class of persons residing in the
United States does not strike a "fair balance" between the interests of the
individual and those of society. The state interest pales when it is
measured against the individual's interest in survival with some measure
of dignity. In addition, societal interests in public health and safety weigh
in on the side of providing some basic assistance. Here again, unless
explicit, congressional authorization will not rescue measures that are
contrary to the Covenant.
B.

State Discriminationon the Basis ofAlienage Affects Family Life

1.

State-initiatedProposalsImpact Family Unity

A host of family unity concerns emerge in the wake of state proposals
for denying public benefits to undocumented immigrants. For the sake of
clarity, this Comment focuses on one specific proposal: the public school
reporting requirements found in Proposition 187.68 This proposal
164. For the seven states, estimated costs are $200-300 million for fiscal year 1993. See R. Clark
et. al., supranote 161, at 13.
165. For example, consider the potential deleterious effect on the public health interests of society
at large.
166. § 411(d), 110 Stat. at 2269.
167. § 400, 110 Stat. at 2260.
168. California Proposition 187, supra note 2, § 7(c).
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requires school officials to verify the immigration status of all students
and their parents and report suspected "illegal immigrants" to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service within forty-five days.'69 The
special danger of this measure is that many families are "mixed,"
consisting of some members who are U.S. citizens, others who are legal
permanent residents, and still others who are undocumented, possibly
awaiting a visa. 7 ' Often the children in these families are U.S. citizens
by birth, while one or both of their parents may be undocumented. These
reporting requirements would therefore place U.S. citizen children at risk
of having a parent reported and possibly deported.
Applying the international tests drawn from interpretations of the
Covenant and the European Convention,' 7 ' this potential impact on
families is insupportable. Although strictly "lawful," it may fail as either
"arbitrary" or unnecessary. Under dhe European Court's jurisprudence,
"necessity" must be supported by evidence of a "pressing social need"
and under both the Covenant and the Convention, a legitimate aim must
be accomplished by proportionate means. Although California may
assert that the reporting requirements aim to address a pressing need to
remove undocumented children from its schools, this claim does not
respond to the potential impact of the reporting requirements on U.S.
citizen children and their right to family unity. A general interest in
deterring illegal immigration is insufficient to counter the profound
interest of these children in remaining with their closest family members,
regardless of their immigration status.
2.

State ReportingProvisionsAuthorized by CongressInpact Family
Privacyand Unity

Federal welfare reform legislation also contains state reporting
provisions."'1 Under these provisions, certain state agencies are required
to report to the Immigration and Naturalization Service "any individual

169. Id. § 7(e).
170. U.S. Comm'n on Immigration Reform, U.S. Immigration Policy: Restorirg Credibility 12226 (1994) (discussing common occurrence of "mixed" families).
171. See supranotes 133-137 and accompanying text.
172. States receiving Social Security grants will be obligated to report to thc Immigration and
Naturalization Service at least four times annually information about any aliens lmown to be in the
United States illegally. § 404(b), 110 Stat. at 2267. Reporting requirements were also among the
recent proposed amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act; for example, the Bryant
amendment would have required hospitals and other health facilities to r.-port to the INS
undocumented persons over the age of 18. See 142 Cong Rec. H2482 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
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who the State knows is unlawfully in the United States."' 73 Especially in
mixed families, such reporting provisions would have a real impact on
the internationally protected rights to both family privacy and family
unity. Congress may assert that requiring states not only to verify
eligibility, but to report undocumented family members is a necessary
response to the "pressing social need" of halting illegal immigration.
Even were this accepted as a legitimate aim based on reasonable criteria,
the question of proportionality of the means must be addressed.
Causing mixed families to fear applying for necessary benefits lest
one of their members be reported and deported is difficult to justify. If
the factors of close family ties, economic interdependence, and long-time
residence are present, and if it is demonstrably difficult for the whole
family to follow the undocumented member to her home country,
decisions from the European Court indicate that a state would have a
heavy burden to show that deportation (the intended result of reporting)
is warranted. Another danger of the reporting proposals is that they
transform state social service providers into immigration officers. 74
Without adequate training in the intricacies of immigration law and the
vagaries of the many different kinds of legal "status," the reports of these
service providers may result in truly "arbitrary" interference with the
privacy of families caused by the mistaken identification and reporting of
suspected illegal immigrants. Although the ultimate aim may be
legitimate, in light of family life concerns, a more proportionate means
must be found.
3.

State Application of FederalSponsor-deemingRules Deters Family
Reunification

Under federal welfare reform proposals, states may apply "sponsordeeming" in determining alien eligibility for public benefits to the same
extent as the federal government. 75 Allowing states to apply the new
federal sponsor-deeming requirements in their reckoning of alien
eligibility for benefits has clear implications for family unity. Not only

173. § 404(b), 110 Stat. at 2267.
174. A similarly complex task was presented by an immigration reform proposal that would have
prevented U.S. citizen children from obtaining AFDC benefits if they had undocumented parents.
Implementing such a provision would require that states devise complicated guardianship schemes
that would permit the citizen children to receive the benefits to which they are entitled. See 142
Cong. Rec. at H-2487, D237 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
175. 110 Stat. 2105, at 2270-71 (including provisions that make Affidavits of Support legally
binding and enforceable for as long as ten years after alien receives public benefit).
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would permitting states to apply federal deeming standards conflict with
judicial precedent, 7 6 but strong international presumptions regarding
family unity would have to be overcome. If states embrace the "option"
of applying federal sponsor-deeming requirements in their eligibility
determinations, immigrants will find it more difficult to help their close
relatives to join them in the United States. The situation of a newly
arrived refugee well illustrates this problem. Eligible to adjust to
permanent residence after one year, she is then qualified to sponsor close
family members. Already struggling to adapt to her new environment,
however, she may be deterred by the onerous requirements of
sponsorship, resulting in prolonged separation from the very family
members who might ease her adaptation to life in the United States.
Here again, the legislation's aim is to ensure alien self-sufficiency.
While the means applied may be lawful, they are not necessary. The state
must show that such measures in fact respond to a "pressing social need"
and, if so, that the means are proportionate to the aim. Weighing the
interest of legal residents in being reunited with their close family
members against the state's fiscal interests, the family unity interests
should prevail. For a refugee hoping to be reunited with her spouse, for
example, there is no reasonable possibility of reunion in the home
country from which she was forced to flee. Her only option is for her
spouse to join her in this country. If rigorous sponsor deeming-rules
attach even at the state level, that reunification may be prevented.
III. CONCLUSION
At a time when limiting immigration is a hot political issue, state and
federal policy makers are crafting laws that grant states more autonomy
in devising eligibility criteria for public benefits. In the trend toward
federally funded "block-grant" programs, increased state independence is
inevitable. This shift in authority to determine eligibility requirements for
public assistance programs does not, however, give states license to
flaunt international human rights norms and U.S. treaty obligations.
Without a voice in the political process, immigrants are particularly
vulnerable to policy proposals that are contrary to their fundamental
interests. Safeguards are required to ensure that immigrants are not
relegated to lives on the margins of this society. International human
rights law provides these necessary protections and must be heeded by
both law makers and the courts.
176. See Barannikova v. Town of Greenwich, 643 A.2d 251, 263 (Conn. 1994)
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